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This paper uses asset and labor market data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to investigate
how the recent "Great Recession" has affected the wealth and retirement of those in the population
who were just approaching retirement age at the beginning of the recession, a potentially vulnerable
segment of the working age population. The retirement wealth held by those ages 53 to 58 before the
onset of the recession in 2006 declined by a relatively modest 2.8 percentage points by 2010. In more
normal times, their wealth would have increased over these four years. Members of older cohorts accumulated
an additional 5 percent of wealth over the same age span. To be sure, a part of their accumulation was
the result of the upside of the housing bubble. The wealth holdings of poorer households were least
affected by the recession. Relative losses are greatest for those who initially had the highest wealth
when the recession began.
The adverse labor market effects of the Great Recession are more modest. Although there is an increase
in unemployment, that increase is not mirrored in the rate of flow out of full-time work or partial retirement.
All told, the retirement behavior of the Early Boomer cohort looks similar, at least so far, to the behavior
observed for members of older cohorts at comparable ages. 
Very few in the population nearing retirement age have experienced multiple adverse events. Although
most of the loss in wealth is due to a fall in the net value of housing, because very few in this cohort
have found their housing wealth under water, and housing is the one asset this cohort is not likely to
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This paper uses asset and labor market data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to 
investigate how the recent "Great Recession" (officially December, 2007 through June, 2009) has 
affected the wealth and retirement of those in the population who were just approaching retirement age 
at the beginning of the recession. The subject of our analysis, the near-retirement population, would 
seem to be highly vulnerable to an unexpected downturn. They have very few effective options for 
adjusting their behavior in the face of the recession. They can postpone retirement and save at a higher 
rate. But postponing retirement is of less help to those who have lost their job. Moreover, there is little 
time to increase saving. So any large losses from the recession are likely to be permanent, affecting 
welfare throughout retirement.  
There are four innovations in this paper that are the direct result of having HRS data available. 
First, the HRS provides panel data at the beginning and end of the recession allowing us to calculate 
changes in key outcomes for the same individuals over the full course of the recession. Second, HRS 
data enable us to compare the changes in outcomes between cohorts -- during the recession for those 
nearing retirement age at the onset of the recession, and over a comparable age span for members of 
older cohorts. Third we identify gainers and losers by their place in the wealth distribution. Fourth, 
speculation as to the likely effects of the recession on retirement most frequently focuses on measures of 
retirement expectations. In contrast, the HRS provides detailed data on actual retirement outcomes.  
Our analysis measures wealth comprehensively, including the values of defined benefit and 
defined contribution pensions, Social Security, individual retirement accounts, the net value of housing 
and other accumulated financial and nonfinancial wealth. With these data, we measure the extent to 
which the recession's effects on volatile assets were cushioned by more stable assets.  
Measures of employment related outcomes reported by the HRS include the extent of full-time 
work, partial retirement and full-retirement, hours of work, unemployment, as well as the number who  
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report themselves as not retired but who also are not working. Flows among these states are measured 
over the four year period 2006 to 2010. The HRS data also allow us to understand what underlies 
changes in employment patterns and how conditions in the job market affected retirement flows. Thus 
involuntary layoffs are reported, as are other reasons leading to changes in employment status, including 
anticipation of a job loss. Enrollment in disability programs is also reported.  
When we compare changes in outcomes by those exposed to the recession with the experience of 
older cohorts when they were the same age, there are a number of surprises. We see the near retirement 
age population experiencing only a 2.8 percentage point decline in wealth over the period of the Great 
Recession. In contrast, over the comparable age span, members of older cohorts enjoyed asset 
accumulations amounting to roughly five percent in real terms. Although the data suggest high rates of 
layoff during the Great Recession, members of older cohorts experienced layoffs at just slightly less than 
the rate observed over the recession. A great deal has been written about changes in retirement behavior 
induced by the recession. But this population on the cusp of retirement at the onset of the recession is 
retiring at roughly the same pace as did members of older cohorts at comparable ages. Finally, this 
cohort of households in their fifties is not frequently affected by multiple adverse events. 
Section II reviews recent contributions to the literature documenting the effects of the recession. 
In Section III we measure the distribution of changes in the various components of wealth over a period 
spanning the recession. Section IV compares the changes in wealth experienced by the retirement age 
population exposed to the recession to the changes experienced by those from older cohorts as they 
passed through comparable ages. Gainers and losers are distinguished in Section V. Following that, 
Section VI examines changes in labor market outcomes, including the numbers falling into various labor 
market states, flows among those states including flows into retirement and reversals in retirement 
status, and reasons for changes in labor market status.  Section VII concludes.   
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II. The Recent Literature 
Although the aftermath of the recession of 2007-2009 is still with us, a number of studies 
examining the effects of the "Great Recession" on older populations have already been completed. A 
first wave of studies used data from before the recession to predict its likely outcome on wealth and 
retirement. A later group of studies used data gathered during the recession to monitor its ongoing 
effects. More recently, some data from the period after the recession officially ended have become 
available. 
  In the context of a study of trends in wealth inequality, Wolff (2011) used 2007 data from 
the Survey of Consumer Finances. He projected the effects of the recession on wealth held by all 
households and by households age 47 to 64. Pension values, including values of both defined 
benefit and defined contribution plans, were calculated as of retirement age. Social Security 
wealth was estimated using earning functions rather than Social Security earnings histories. 
Wolff (p.38) concludes that between 2007 and 2009, "Among middle-aged households, mean 
pension wealth was down by 4.2 percent, mean net worth also by 4.2 percent and median net 
worth by 8.2 percent, while mean augmented wealth AW was down by 3.3 percent and median 
AW by 7.7 percent", where augmented wealth includes pensions and Social Security.  
In other studies in the first wave of analyses examining the effects of the "Great Recession" on 
those approaching retirement age, the focus was on the how the sharp decline in the stock market would 
affect wealth and retirement. Some predicted that retirements would be deferred and the labor force 
participation of older workers increased. Thus Sass, Monk and Haverstick (2010) suggest: "The stock 
market crash of 2008 significantly dimmed the retirement prospects of those approaching retirement. 
These workers are heavily dependent on 401(k) plans, as opposed to traditional defined benefit pensions, 
as a source of retirement income." Similarly, Munnell, Muldoon and Sass (2009) concluded their  
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discussion of the effects of the recession on retirement as follows: "With about two-thirds of their 401(k) 
portfolios invested in equities, older workers should recognize that the only way to compensate for their 
decimated assets is to remain in the workforce longer."  
Others suggested the stock market decline would have smaller effects on the wealth and 
retirement of those approaching retirement age. Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2010b) found that 
in 2006, the year preceding the recession, those in their early to mid fifties had only fifteen percent of 
their total wealth in stocks, including 401k plans and IRAs, so that even an initial stock market decline 
of one third would have a limited effect on their assets. Focusing on the effects of the decline in housing 
wealth, they found that most older workers had homes with limited mortgage obligations, so that even 
with a twenty percent decline in housing prices from values reported by respondents in 2006, 6.4% of 
the households approaching retirement age would find their home equity under water, with their home 
values exceeded by their mortgage obligations. They argued that the wealth of the retirement age 
population would only be affected in a limited way by the decline in the stock market and housing prices 
because Social Security and defined benefit pensions would cushion the effects of the recession on total 
wealth.
2 When the modest effect of the stock market decline on the wealth of the retirement age 
population is considered together with previous estimates indicating that changes in stock market wealth 
have only limited effects on retirement (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2002), the stock market decline by 
itself might lead to an increase of the retirement age amounting only to a couple of months. Moreover, 
the majority of homes are not sold by older persons until one or another spouse becomes very ill or dies 
                                                 
2 Social Security wealth is not entirely insensitive to the retirement date. If the recession induces earlier benefit 
claiming and reduces the number of years worked, then some years of earnings that would have been counted among 
the highest 35 years may be lost, reducing the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) upon which Social 
Security benefits are based. In most cases, this effect is relatively small. There are other ways in which the recession 
may have a modest effect on benefits. Butrica, Johnson and Smith (2011) note that AIME is in part determined by 
the wage index used to inflate past earnings. Wage growth is lower in recessions, reducing the wage index used to 
raise past earnings to the year the covered individual reaches age 60. Should the economy return to its previous path, 
this mechanism might not apply to younger workers. However, having a lower economy wide wage at age 60 will 
reduce the indexing of past earnings for those who were approaching retirement age at the onset of the recession. 
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(Venti and Wise, 2004). As a result, those approaching retirement age at the onset of the recession have 
time for housing prices to recover before they are likely to sell. 
When analyzing the effects of the recession on retirement, it is also necessary to consider the 
effects of layoffs. Again there is a first wave of studies that bases predictions on past behavior of 
retirement during recessions. By separating many individuals from long term employers, layoffs reduce 
the reward to work. Even if they could secure another job, most of those losing a long term job would 
experience a sharp decline in the offered wage. Wage reductions, costs of job search, relatively short 
time remaining in the labor market even for those who successfully locate a new job, all work toward 
encouraging earlier retirement by older persons who have been laid off (Stevens and Chan, 2001; Coile 
and Levine, 2009). Although older persons are less likely to experience a layoff given their greater 
tenure, those who are laid off have a lower probability of locating a new position at an acceptable wage 
(Chan and Huff Stevens, 2001; Johnson and Mommaerts, 2011). The combination of reduced pay for 
work and the extraordinary difficulty older workers have in securing a new job may lead many to simply 
give up and permanently exit the labor market.  
Thus the question is whether the increase in work by older individuals induced by the loss of 
wealth suffered as a result of the recession exceeds or falls short of the reduction in work resulting from 
job loss and the decline in labor market opportunities facing older persons. On net, the recession might 
well increase, rather than reduce, retirements. This prediction is consistent with Coile and Levine's 
(2009) analyses of the relation of recessions to retirement observed in past years. (For a contrary view, 
see The Conference Board, 2011).  
Following studies that used information gathered before the onset of the recession to predict its 
effects on retirement and wealth, the next wave of studies used data collected during the recession or just 
after it hit its trough. Some of these studies analyze the effects of the recession on wealth. Some report  
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the incidence of unemployment, and the effects of the recession on retirement expectations. Typically 
these studies use data from Internet surveys or telephone surveys designed for quick turnaround. An 
extremely useful set of studies based on this approach has been conducted by Hurd and Rohwedder 
(2010). They trace the effects of the recession and its aftermath using data from Rand's high frequency 
internet survey. This survey, the American Life Panel (ALP), was administered quarterly in 2008-2009, 
with the quarterly survey supplemented by shorter monthly surveys thereafter. Chakrabarti, Lee, van der 
Klaauw and Zafar (2011) take a similar approach with internet data. (Rix, 2011) focus more on the 
respondents' perceptions of changes in their financial circumstances and their prospects should they 
retire, rather than documenting the exact size of losses by asset category. 
More recently, a few studies use well known panel data sets to compare wealth outcomes before 
and during, or just after the recession. Bricker et al. (2011) use panel data from the 2007-2009 Survey of 
Consumer Finances to track changes in household financial status, finding a great deal of heterogeneity 
among households in how they have been affected by the recession.  
Most studies of the effect of the recession on retirement typically focus on retirement 
expectations, rather than on actual retirement outcomes.
3 Many of these studies find respondents 
expecting to delay their retirements by many months or years due to the recession. For example, Sass, 
Monk and Haverstick (2010) suggest there will be "A widespread rise in the expected age of retirement. 
About 40 percent expect to retire later than they had before the downturn – somewhat more than 
reported in earlier surveys – with most of those who intend to work longer delaying retirement by four 
or more years." Rix (2011) reports that older persons are expecting to work more by delaying exit from a 
full-time job, working part time, or by returning to the labor market after having left.  
                                                 
3 See, for example, Hurd and Rohwedder (2010), Sass, Monk and Haverstic (2010), Chakrabarti, Lee, van der 
Klaauw and Zafar (2011), Rix (2011), Helman, Copeland and Vanderhei (2011) and The Conference Board (2011).  
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In contrast, examining changes in retirement expectations in a multivariate setting, Helppie 
McFall (2011) finds a relatively small effect of wealth changes on expected retirement. Using data from 
the University of Michigan's web- and mail-based CogEcon survey and adopting a regression 
framework, she suggests that the average wealth loss from July 2008 to May/June 2009 was associated 
with a 2.5 month decline in expected retirement age.  
Findings that use data from the Health and Retirement Study collected before and during the 
recession are just appearing. Goda, Shoven and Slavov (2011) use data from the 2006 and 2008 Health 
and Retirement Study. Their findings fall between those of Helppie McFall (2011) and the other studies 
of retirement expectations. On the one hand, they find the recession associated with a large increase in 
the expected probability of working full-time at ages 62 or 65, or the expected retirement age. On the 
other hand, they conclude that the change in the stock market, attenuated by the change in 
unemployment, are together insufficient to explain the large increase in the expected date of retirement.
4  
Census data have recently been used to investigate the effects of the recession on retirement. 
Farber's (2011) analysis of data from the Displaced Worker Survey, a supplement to the Current 
Population Survey, suggests the recession may accelerate retirements.
5 Farber uses these data to 
examine job loss and post displacement labor force status from 1984 through 2010. Job loss is extensive 
and unemployment duration is particularly long in the current recession. Reemployment rates are 
especially low when compared to other downturns over that period. Farber concludes that the 
consequences of job loss in the "Great Recession" have been unusually severe. He finds the adverse 
                                                 
4 Goda, Shoven and Slavov (2011) use the reported date of interview and a geographic indicator as the bases for 
determining the level of the S&P 500 index, housing prices and local unemployment. Interview date is taken to be 
exogenous to all relevant controls so that there is no effort to standardize for differences among individuals in 
wealth, housing and mortgage value, or the value of wealth held in the stock market. Note, however, that at least in 
the early waves of the HRS, there was some systematic relation between the interview date and household 
characteristics such as employment status and type of job. The existence of this relationship means that the date of 
the survey interview may not be an unbiased instrument for market and other economic conditions. That is, the 
survey date may be correlated with unmeasured characteristics of the individual or household. 
5 Basic descriptive statistics on the labor market experience of older persons during the "Great Recession" can be 
found in in Copeland (2011) and in Johnson and Park (2011).  
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labor market effects of the current recession, including low reemployment rates, to be more severe both 
for all workers and for those aged 55 to 64. Consistent with the self reports of older respondents 
indicating they will be postponing their retirement, in the current recession it is no longer the case that 
older job losers are more likely than younger job losers to leave the labor force. Moreover, older job 
losers are unlikely to leave the labor force despite the fact that they suffer a greater loss of specific 
human capital when they lose their job, and reemployed job losers ages 55 to 64 suffer greater wage 
losses than do members of other age groups. An obvious question is the influence of unemployment 
insurance in shaping this early finding. 
Bosworth and Burtless (2011) analyze which factors are affecting Social Security benefit 
claiming and labor market micro and macro measures of labor force participation. As explanatory 
variables, they use time series data on returns to household wealth, including stocks, bonds and housing, 
and indicators of unemployment. They find labor market outcomes for men are not significantly related 
to changes in returns to wealth. Unemployment is associated with reduced labor force participation of 
older men over the age of 60, but not those 55 to 59 years of age. This study does not include 
information on the level or composition of household wealth. Nor are pensions included in their 
analysis. The bottom line is that their time series data indicate small or negligible effects of either 
changes in returns to wealth or labor market conditions on the labor market activity of those approaching 
retirement age. 
An important question is whether and how retirement expectations and expected dates of benefit 
claiming diverge from actual dates of retirement or actual dates of claiming. Retirement expectations 
may be revised as new information arrives; an adverse labor market environment may prevent 
expectations from being realized; so may other unforeseen changes in own or spouse health, or other 
family circumstances. Hurd, Reti and Rohwedder (2009) argue that retirement expectations are  
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predictive of actual retirement behavior. On the other hand, recent data suggest that despite expectations 
of delayed retirements, actual retirements may have increased after the onset of the recession. 
Importantly, for example, data from the Social Security Administration indicates that after the onset of 
the recession, benefit claiming at younger ages has increased. An increase in claiming at age 62 is 
consistent with the idea that the recession has accelerated, rather than delayed, retirements. Those who 
retire before normal retirement age are subject to an earnings test, and so are unlikely to be claiming 
their benefits early even though they continue working on their long term jobs.
6 Thus claimants in their 
early 60s are more likely to come from the ranks of the retired and others out of the labor force rather 
than from those who continue to be employed. Consequently, it is important to look at the actual data on 
retirement and not just at retirement expectations.  
In attempting to understand the effect of the recession on retirements, it is also important to bear 
in mind the trend in retirement. The data present a picture of a complex and changing retirement trend 
leading up to the recession. For example, a number of changes in Social Security and pension 
regulations reduced the penalty to delayed retirement. This in turn reduced retirements for those over 
age 65 (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2009a). Operating in the same direction, the increase in women's labor 
force participation and decline in the incidence and duration of interruptions to their employment spells 
has also been accompanied by an increase in women's retirement age. It is clear that the trend toward 
earlier retirement observed through most of the twentieth century was reversed after 1990. But it is 
possible that the trend to earlier retirement might once again reassert itself once the influence of one-
time changes in retirement incentives and other factors work their way through. On the other hand, if the 
trend to delayed retirement is mainly driven by increases in life expectancy and the demography of the 
                                                 
6The penalty for early retirement is roughly actuarially fair, so early claiming of benefits does not affect Social 
Security wealth. However, early claiming does affect annual income over the remainder of the individual's life. In 
addition, early claiming may lead to lower incomes in retirement in the form of lower survivor benefits. For an 
analysis of the effects of recessions on early claiming and subsequent benefits, see Coile and Levine (2011).  
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labor market, where retirement of the massive baby boom generation increases the demand for older 
workers, the trend is likely to continue. Uncertainty about the future course of the trend in retirement 
increases the difficulty of isolating the effects of the recession on labor market outcomes. 
Importantly, studies using data from after the onset of the recession were able to document the 
incidence and likely consequences of multiple adverse events: including stock market losses, declines in 
home values amidst a frozen housing market and layoffs. Multiple adverse events mean, first of all, that 
many households would experience at least one type of loss. Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) found, for 
example, that between November 2008 and April 2010, 39 percent of all households experienced some 
type of financial stress, which included falling behind on the mortgage payment, having negative home 
equity, or having one or another spouse unemployed. The interaction of adverse events may magnify 
their negative consequences. For example, those who experienced a layoff and would normally have 
sold their homes and moved elsewhere could not do so without realizing a capital loss from selling their 
house. Those who sold their home to move to a new job could not ride out the decline in housing prices 
as someone who had not lost their job could. Nor could a homeowner who experienced a layoff relocate 
to a more favorable job market as readily as a renter who lost his job. 
This review of the available literature highlights the many remaining uncertainties about the size 
and distribution of wealth and job losses due to the Great Recession. Given our special focus on the near 
retirement population, the availability of detailed information in the Health and Retirement Study that 
spans the recession and reports on these outcomes for those approaching retirement age at the onset of 
the recession is a welcome addition to our analytical arsenal. We now will apply these data to analyze 
how the Great Recession has affected this important segment of the population.  
 
III. Changes in Wealth Between 2006 and 2010 for the Near-Retirement Population  
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  We begin with a description of changes in household wealth spanning the period of the 
recession. The data on household wealth reported in Table 1 are from  the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) for members of the Early Boomer cohort, those residing in households with at least one member 
age 53 to 58 in 2006. Respondents are included in the analysis only if they participated in the survey 
both in 2006 and 2010 and if their household structure remained unchanged over the intervening four 
years. Households reporting a wealth level that falls within the top or bottom 1 percent of households in 
the relevant year are excluded. Averages are reported in Table 1. Values for the median ten percent of 
wealth holding households are reported in Appendix Table 1A, while Appendix Table 1 B reports results 
for those in the bottom quartile of households ranked according to total wealth.  
  The components of wealth in 2006 are reported in current dollars in column 1 and in 2010 
dollars in column 6. Wealth outcomes for 2010 are reported in current dollars in column 3. The basic 
elements of wealth include the present value of Social Security, the present value of pensions, 
disaggregated according to whether the plan is defined benefit or defined contribution, the value of the 
house net of mortgage debt, other real estate (primarily second homes), business assets, vehicles, 
financial assets (including direct stock holdings), and assets in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). 
Appendix 1 describes the calculations of the components of wealth.
7 Missing values are imputed using 
methods described in Appendix 1.
8 
As seen in row 1, the last column of Table 1, when measured in 2010 dollars, the total wealth of 
the Early Boomer population is three percent (2.8 percent) lower in 2010 than it was in 2006.  Thus the 
                                                 
7 Calculations of the components of total wealth and comparable estimates for the median ten percent of wealth 
holding households and for the bottom quartile of wealth holding households are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
See Appendix 1 for a description of the calculations of the various components of wealth and for a description of the 
imputation procedure. Those falling in the top and bottom 1 percent of wealth holding households are excluded from 
the table. 
8 Imputations from Rand for 2010 wealth data were not available at the time we wrote this paper. Therefore, to put 
the imputed wealth amounts on the same footing for both 2006 and 2010, we have imputed missing asset values and 
values of assets when reports are confined to brackets. Our imputations for 2006 do not exactly match those in the 
Rand data, but there are no large or systematic differences. In later calculations where we report wealth changes for 
cohorts at comparable ages to the Early Boomers, we use wealth estimates from Rand for both years.   
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cohort approaching retirement age has experienced a very modest reduction of total wealth as a result of 
the recession. A similar story is found for members of the median ten percent of wealth holding 
households. In Appendix Table 1A, when measured in constant dollars, the total wealth of the median 
ten percent of wealth holding households in 2010 is 4 percent (4.3 percent) lower than the wealth of the 
median ten percent of wealth holding households in 2006. The change in wealth for those in the bottom 
quartile of wealth holding households is even closer to zero. As seen in Table 1B, there is only a one 
percent decline between 2006 and 2010.   
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Table 1: Components of Wealth in 2006 and 2010 For Households with at Least One Member Born from 1948 to 1953. Weighted. 
 
Source of Wealth 



















Total     $780k  100  $847k  100  1.11  $871k  0.97 
Social Security Plus Pensions  426  54.6  473  55.8  1.15  476  0.99 
Social  Security  229 29.4 256 30.2 1.12 256  1.00 
Pension  Value  197 25.3 218 25.7 1.20 220  0.99 
     DB Value  135  17.3  141  16.6  1.18  150  0.94 
     DC Value (current and past jobs)  62  7.9  77  9.1  1.24  70  1.10 
          Current (job) DC Balances   47  6.0  51  6.0  1.09  53  0.96 
          Current DC in Stocks   29  3.7  25  3.0  0.86  33  0.76 
Net House Value  150  19.2  128  15.1  0.85  167  0.77 
Real Estate  32  4.1  26  3.1  0.81  35  0.74 
Business Assets   34  4.4  31  3.7  0.91  38  0.82 
Net Value of Vehicles  18  2.3  17  2.0  0.94  20  0.85 
Financial Assets   70  9.0  84  9.9  1.20  78  1.08 
     Direct Stocks Holdings  34  4.4  42  5.0  1.24  38  1.11 
IRA Assets  52  6.7  87  10.3  1.67  58  1.50 
          IRA in Stocks Value  38  4.9  56  6.6  1.47  43  1.30 
IRA Plus Stocks Holdings Plus DC 
in Stocks 
110 14.1 137 16.2 1.25 123  1.11 
Observations 1949  1949  1949 
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Now turn to the elements comprising total wealth in 2006. As seen in column 2 of Table 1, 
pensions and Social Security are the two most important assets. Together they accounted for 54.6 
percent of total wealth in 2006. From Appendix Table A1, for the median ten percent of households 
arrayed according to total wealth, pensions and Social Security accounted for 64 percent of total wealth. 
For the bottom quartile of wealth holding households, pensions and Social Security accounted for 83.7 
percent of total wealth. This reflects the well known result that Social Security accounts for a larger 
share of total wealth as we move down the wealth distribution, a relationship that is not fully offset by 
the increasing importance of pensions as we move up the distribution of wealth. For households in the 
Early Boomer cohort, on average Social Security accounts for 29.4 percent of household wealth. For 
households with median wealth, Social Security accounts for 43.9 percent of total wealth. For the 
bottom quartile of wealth holding households, Social Security accounts for 79.2 percent of total wealth. 
Roughly speaking, in 2006 pensions accounted for a quarter of total wealth at the mean, a fifth for 
median households, and for a tenth of total wealth for households in the bottom quartile.  
The value of housing is the next largest component of total wealth. At the mean it accounted for 
19.2 percent of total wealth in 2006. For median households, housing accounted for 21 percent of total 
wealth, while for those in the bottom quartile, housing accounted for 10.5 percent of total wealth.  
Financial and IRA assets together accounted for 15.7 percent of total wealth at the mean. For 
median households, they accounted for 7.9 percent of total assets, while for those in the bottom quartile 
of wealth holding households, they did not contribute to total wealth, with a combined value of zero 
once debt is subtracted from assets held in checking, saving, DCs, bonds, treasury bills and other assets.  
Consider next the changes in the components of total wealth reported between the 2006 and 2010 
surveys. We examine these changes using constant 2010 dollars. Looking at the last column of row 3 of 
Table 1, by construction there is no change in the present value of Social Security. That is, we use 2010  
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as the base period for calculating the present value of Social Security wealth no matter what the base 
year of the survey.
9 Otherwise, we would find differences in total wealth between 2006 and 2010 simply 
because of the passage of time.
10  
A comparable approach is taken to calculating the present value of defined benefit pensions. In 
calculating DB wealth, 2010 is taken as the base period in which the present value is centered. From 
rows 4, 5 and 6 we see that the present value of pensions fell by about one percent in real terms between 
2006 and 2010, with a six percent decline in the value of DB plans, and a ten percent increase in the 
value of DC plans. The value of DB wealth will be influenced by rollovers of DB plans into IRAs. The 
value of DC plans held in stocks fell by about a quarter, with assets in DC plans on current jobs falling 
by about 4 percent as some left their jobs. When this happens, DC wealth in plans from previous jobs 
are increased, partially negating any loss in total DC pension wealth. In addition, some DC plan 
balances were rolled into IRAs. Thus turnover in pension balances is also reflected in IRA assets 
reported in the fourth row from the bottom of the table. IRA assets are up fifty percent over the four year 
period.  
There are four asset categories that suffered major declines in value over the recession: housing, 
real estate (mainly second homes), business assets and the net value of vehicles. Focus first on housing. 
Given that net housing wealth represented almost a fifth of total wealth, its decline is of greatest 
                                                 
9 In all calculations we use a CPI increase of 2.8 percent per year and a nominal interest rate of 5.8 percent, 
approximations taken from the Report of the Board of Trustees of the Social Security Administration.  
10 Although it is reasonable to take the present values as of the survey date, and it is true that Social Security wealth is 
becoming more valuable as the individual approaches the age when benefits can be received, the aim of our exercise is to 
isolate the differences in wealth before and after the recession. Accordingly, we evaluate the wealth equivalent of income 
flows as of the same date even though the two periods are four years apart. Thus when we compare values in real 2010 
dollars, there is no change in the value of Social Security wealth. To be sure, changes in earnings induced by the recession 
will affect the present value of Social Security benefits if earnings in later years change the average of lifetime earnings 
counted in the high 35 years of earnings that are used in the AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings) calculation. We do 
not have Social Security earnings records for 2010 with which to calculate any resulting differences in PIA (Primary 
Insurance Amount). Past earnings are indexed through age 60, and most members of this cohort cannot change the years of 
earnings counted through early retirement age by changing claiming behavior. As noted previously, Butrica, Johnson and 
Smith (2011) point out, in computing average indexed monthly earnings, the wage index used to inflate past earnings is 
reduced for those who reach age 60 after the recession began. We do not make this adjustment. 
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importance. In nominal terms, net housing wealth declined by 15 percent, while in real terms, housing 
wealth declined by 23 percent over the four year period. This is greater than the decline in housing 
prices because the relevant measure for a wealth calculation subtracts any mortgage obligation from the 
gross value of the house. Thus net housing wealth is more sensitive to the decline in housing prices than 
is gross housing wealth. The $39,000 decline in real net housing wealth from $167,000 to $128,000 
represents 4.5 percent of total wealth held at the onset of the recession.
11 Thus the decline in housing 
wealth exceeds the entire decline in total wealth of households, and has absorbed some of the increase in 
total wealth that otherwise accrued from other assets.  
As seen in Appendix Table 1C, we do not often see negative net housing wealth for members of 
the Early Boomer cohort. In 2006, 42 out of 1949 households had negative net housing wealth, 
averaging -$81,716 in 2006. In 2010, 92 households had negative housing wealth, averaging -$66,047 
per household. Although this is a serious problem for those owning houses that are under water, and 
while the average gap is quite high for the affected households, only five percent of households in the 
Early Boomer cohort have negative housing wealth, even by 2010.
                                                 
11 On average the gross value of housing declined from $218,409 in 2006 to $194,203 in 2010, a decline of 
11 percent. However, mortgage debt averaged $68,862 in 2006 and $66,319 in 2010, so that the $24,000 
decline in gross housing prices amounted to a 16.2 percent decline in nominal net housing wealth.  
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IV. Comparing Wealth Changes from 2006 to 2010 with Changes Over Analogous Periods for 
Previous Cohorts 
Next we want to consider whether the changes in wealth for the Early Boomer cohort are 
consistent with those observed for earlier cohorts. Documenting differences over the same age span for 
members of earlier (older) cohorts, the War Babies ages 51 to 56 in 1998, and those HRS cohort 
members who were ages 51 to 56 in 1992, will increase our understanding of what part of the changes 
from 2006 to 2010 are due mainly to the recession. We are aware that differences in the path of wealth 
accumulation between members of the Early Boomer and older cohorts may reflect influences other than 
the recession, such as ongoing trends. Nevertheless, although not precise, we will find these 
comparisons to be quite informative.  
To be more specific, before-after comparisons indicate that the total wealth of the Early Boomer 
population declined by 2.8 percentage points over the period of the Great Recession. The decline in 
housing prices reduced their total wealth by about 4.5 percentage points, so there was some net growth 
in the value of other assets. If we are to determine the full effects of the recession, we need some idea of 
how wealth would have grown in more stable economic times. Our findings indicate that wealth grew by 
7.6 percent for the HRS cohort, and by 3.2 percentage points for the War Babies. With the two earlier 
cohorts enjoying average gains of 5.4 percentage points, the net wealth at the end of the Great Recession 
would have been about 8 percentage points higher had the Early Boomers' wealth grown at that same 
rate as seen for member of older cohorts.  
The housing bubble played a role in increasing the growth of total wealth experienced by the 
older cohorts. Housing value grew by 38 percent between 2000 and 2004. In contrast, it fell 23.4 percent 
over the period of the Great Recession. More specifically, between 1994 and 1998, the growth in 
housing wealth accounted for 0.9 percentage points of the 7.6 percent increase in total wealth. For the  
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War Babies, between 2000 and 2004 the growth in housing wealth increased total wealth by 5 
percentage points, more than the 3.2 percentage point growth in total wealth. For the Early Boomers, the 
decline in housing value reduced total wealth by 4.5 percentage points, even though total wealth 
declined by only 2.8 percentage points in total.  
In sum, even though this is by no means a formal analysis, it does suggest the Early Boomers 
experienced only a modest decline in total wealth over the period of the recession. They accumulated 
less wealth over the period of the recession than they would have were they members of cohorts born six 
or twelve years earlier, but a good part of that difference is due to the fact that members of the War Baby 
cohort enjoyed a wealth increase from the housing bubble.  
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Table 2: Percent Changes in the Value of Components of Wealth For Members of Various HRS Cohorts 
Over the Period from the Second to Fourth Wave They Are in the Survey 
 
Source of Wealth 
 































Total     120.1 115.4 108.6 107.6 103.2  97.2 
Social Security Plus Pensions  114.4  106.3  111.0  102.2  95.4  99.4 
Social  Security  111.1 111.6 111.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Pension  Value  117.7 101.6 110.7 106.0  90.8  99.1 
     DB Value  112.3  101.6  104.4  100.6  90.5  94.0 
     DC Value  141.7  101.9  124.2  129.7  91.5  110.0 
          Current DC Balances   131.6  0.87  108.5  113.3  80.0  96.2 
          Current DC in Stocks   -  -  86.2  -  -  75.8 
Net  House  Value  118.8  154.1 85.3 106.5  138.7 76.6 
Real  Estate  106.3  137.5 81.3  95.9 123.8 74.3 
Business  Assets    110.0  111.5  91.2 96.8 97.1 81.6 
Net Value of Vehicles  100.0  106.3  94.4  91.3  105.0  85.0 
Financial  Assets    141.5 116.0 120.0 126.5 104.7 107.7 
     Direct Stocks Holdings  173.9  104.1  123.5  160.0  93.8  110.5 
IRA  Assets  174.1 100.0 167.3 157.1  90.3  150.0 
          IRA in Stocks Value  -  -  147.4  -  -  130.2 
IRA Plus Stocks Holdings 
Plus DC in Stocks 
- -  124.5  - -  111.4 






V. Gainers and Losers 
  In this section we distinguish those whose total wealth, as well as individual assets, gained or lost 
value over the period spanning the Great Recession. Table 3 reports the percentage of individuals 
experiencing changes in each of the components of wealth between 2006 and 2010, and the resulting 
changes in value. The value figures presented in Table 3 are different from those presented earlier in 
Table 1, where average values of assets held by all members of the cohort were reported for 2006 and 
2010. Specifically, the earlier table included a value for an asset whether an individual held the asset or 
not, so that zero values were included for those in the population who did not report owning the asset. In 
contrast, asset values reported in Table 3 include values only for the subgroup of the population that 
actually owned the asset.
12 
  Column 1 of Table 3 reports the share of Early Boomer households owning the indicated asset in 
2006. Among the five most valuable assets from Table 1, 98 percent of households were eligible for 
future Social Security income, 71 percent had pension wealth, 79 percent owned a home, 66 percent had 
financial assets, and 43 percent had IRA balances.  
  The proportion of winning and losing households are reported in columns 2 through 5. Losers 
and gainers are distinguished by whether their assets lost or gained value in terms of nominal or real 
dollars. Columns 2 and 4 list the proportions of households that enjoyed a loss or gain in the value of the 
indicated asset in terms of nominal dollars, while the proportions of households that enjoyed a loss or 
gain in real dollars are reported in columns 3 and 5. When assets are evaluated in 2010 dollars, from row 
1, column 3, we see that 51.0 percent of households lost wealth between 2006 and 2010, while from row 
                                                 
12 Another difference between the samples included in Tables 1 and 3 should be noted. Households are excluded from the 
sample in Table 1 if they fall in top or the bottom one percent of wealth holding households in 2006 when 2006 wealth levels 
are reported, and in 2010 when 2010 wealth levels are reported. Households are excluded from Table 3 if they fall in the top 
one percent of wealth holding households in 2006 or in 2010. This accounts for the slight difference in number of households 
included in each table. 
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1, column 5, 48.3 percent of households gained wealth. When those assets are evaluated, from the last 
column of row 1, the total value of assets held fell by 2.6 percent between 2006 and 2010.
13 
  Turning now to the major asset categories, with the exception of Social Security wealth, which is 
held constant in real terms by construction, the number of households experiencing a loss in value for 
each major asset type is greater than the number of households where the asset gained in value. 
Comparing the numbers of households falling in columns 3 and 5, 53 percent of households experienced 
a loss in pension value, while 44 percent experienced a gain. The remainder experienced no change. In 
terms of housing wealth, losing households outnumbered gainers by 69 percent to 30 percent. Similarly, 
63 percent of households experienced a loss in financial assets vs. 37 percent who experienced a gain. 
The one asset category where gainers outnumbered losers was IRA assets, where 47 percent of 
households reported a decline in the value of their IRAs in real terms, while 54 percent reported a gain. 
  The last column of Table 3, starting with row 2 down, reports the changes in the real value of 
each individual asset among households who had a positive value for the asset in both 2006 and 2010.
14 
Net housing value declined by a quarter for those households owning their home in both periods. 
Moreover, real estate (mainly second homes), business assets and the net value of vehicles declined in 
value. But the other major asset categories showed a gain, and the gains were almost large enough to 
offset the loss in net housing wealth and in other losing categories. Pensions rose in real value by 1.2 
percent; financial assets increased by 3.5 percent, and IRA assets gained 40.2 percent. The gain in IRA 
assets most certainly reflects the effects of rollovers. Note, however, that with the real pension wealth 
                                                 
13 A word of warning is in order as we move from overall averages to statistics on losers and gainers. Wealth 
numbers are reported with significant error. Moreover, some respondents may neglect to report an asset in one 
survey while reporting it in another. When changes are estimated, the gain or loss for an individual who neglected to 
report the asset in one year or another will be equal to the full amount of the asset. Finally, assets are imputed 
separately in each year of the survey. Imputations based on cross section data will create very large gains or losses 
when the same household is not used to impute the missing asset, or asset bracket, in both years. 
14 Again, these numbers differ from those reported in Table 1, which included all households, including those that 
did not hold the asset in question in 2006 and thus had a zero value for the asset. The HRS data provides information 
on total assets as reported in Table 1, but does not allow us to trace specific transactions, either sales or purchases of 
particular assets. We do not know the offsets in the accounts used to finance the changes.  
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increase of 1.2 percentage points between the two years, the increase in the values of pensions due to 
contributions and additional work was sufficient to offset the loss in pension value to rollovers. DB 
values grow in part because DB pension wealth on current jobs is prorated by the ratio of tenure to date 
divided by tenure by the time the individual reaches expected retirement age. For DC plans, balances 
grow with contributions over the intervening years, as well as real interest and other payments.   
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Percent Change in 
Value, 2006 to 2010, 
Conditional on 
Having Component 
of Wealth in 2006 & 
2010 
Percent Experiencing  
Decline in Value in 
Percent Experiencing  



















Total 99.8  34.9  51.0  65.1  48.3  $842k  8.8  -2.6 
Social Security  98.0  0  0  100  0  261  11.7  0 
Pension 71.1  43.4  53.4  56.5  43.6  328  13.0  1.2 
      DB Pension  50.0  65.3  71.8 34.7  28.2  314 11.6 -0.1 
      DC Pension  49.7  38.8 43.2 60.6  45.3  162  19.0  6.6 
Net House Value  79.3  59.1  69.4  36.2  30.4  157  -15.6  -24.5 
Real Estate  15.3  74.0  77.2 23.1  22.8  214  -5.6  -15.5 
Business Assets    11.8  68.5  74.1  25.9  25.9  345  5.7  -5.4 
Net Value of Vehicles  86.2  53.9  61.7  39.7  38.3  20  -6.6  -16.4 
Financial Assets   65.8  59.8  63.2  39.6  36.8  151  15.6  3.5 
       Direct Stock  Holdings  25.6  67.8  73.6  27.6  26.4  194  20.3  7.8 
IRA Assets  43.3  42.5  46.5  57.0  53.5  216  56.5  40.2 
    IRA in Stocks Value  35.5  50.9  54.2  48.7  45.8  161  30.1  16.5 
Total Observations  1927 
    Households with top and bottom 1% of total wealth in 2006 and 2010 are excluded from this table.          
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  Table 3A describes the distribution of losers among households ordered by their wealth. Results 
are described for the ten deciles of wealth holding households, with the wealth decile in 2006 indicated 
in the first column of the Table. The second column of the table reports the average level of wealth in 
2006 for the members of the indicated wealth decile.  
  Column 3 reports the ratio of total wealth held in 2010 to total wealth held in 2006 by members 
of each wealth decile, where again the order is determined by level of total wealth in 2006. From column 
4 of Table 3A, 39 percent of households in the lowest wealth decile experience a decline in the value of 
their assets. This rises to 70 percent of the households in the highest wealth decile. Thus as wealth 
increases, a smaller proportion of households experiences a gain and a larger share experience a loss. 
Two reasons for this may be mentioned. First, the sources of wealth held by those in the lowest wealth 
decile are likely to be much less vulnerable to the recession than are the sources of wealth held by those 
in the top deciles. Comparing Table 1 with Appendix Table 1B, members of the lower quartile of wealth 
holding households are much less likely to own a house, to have stocks or bonds, or to have pensions. 
Indeed, 79 percent of the wealth held by members of the lowest wealth decile is due to Social Security 
wealth. Second, measurement errors, especially errors of omission in the 2006 wealth data, are likely to 
play an important role in affecting the ratio of wealth in 2010 to 2006 by wealth decile. These errors are 
especially likely to cause an understatement of the share of households in the lower decile who lose 
wealth as a result of the recession. Households that actually have higher levels of wealth but fail to 
report or understate the value of one or more major assets are much more likely to fall in the lowest 
wealth decile in 2006. While it may not be common to fail to report having a house, the financially 
knowledgeable respondent may confuse the net and gross value of a house. If the expected sale price net 
of the mortgage is reported as the gross value of the house, the value of the house will be substantially 
understated. An error like that may not be repeated in 2010. Thus if there was an understatement of asset  
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values in 2006, and that understatement is not repeated in 2010, the household will have been placed in 
too low a wealth decile in 2006, and will also exhibit a large gain in assets between 2006 and 2010.  
  The next five columns of Table 3A report additional information on the relation between the size 
of the asset decline and initial wealth. Thus from row 1, column 5, 19 percent of households in the 
lowest wealth decile experience a loss of 0 to 10 percent of total wealth, but 6 percent of households 
experience a loss of more than half their total wealth. In contrast, 12 percent of households in the highest 
wealth decile experience a loss of 0 to 10 percent, and another 13 percent experience a loss of more than 
half their assets. 
  Table 3B reports the distribution of households gaining wealth between 2006 and 2010 by the 
amount of wealth gained. The share of households experiencing a gain in assets at first increases with 
initial wealth, but from the fifth to tenth decile the share experiencing a gain declines with wealth. Forty 
nine percent of households falling in the lowest wealth decile in 2006 experience a gain in wealth over 
the period of the recession, while thirty percent of households falling in the top wealth decile experience 
a gain.   
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Table 3A: Distribution of Households Experiencing a Decline in Real Wealth Between 





































$56k 1.46  0.39  0.19 
 
0.06 0.03 0.03 0.06 
2 
 
150 1.39  0.39  0.26  0.06  0.02  0.03  0.02 
3 
 
256 1.17  0.45  0.15  0.11  0.05  0.08  0.06 
4 
 
392 1.08  0.54  0.15  0.15  0.08  0.10  0.05 
5 
 
520 1.13  0.46  0.21  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.02 
6 
 
661 1.04  0.56  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.07 
7 
 
858 1.11  0.54  0.15  0.11  0.09  0.12  0.07 
8 
 
1,097 1.10  0.52  0.15 0.13  0.07  0.13  0.04 
9 
 
1,492 0.91  0.68  0.16 0.16  0.14  0.10  0.12 
10 
 
2,524 0.82  0.70  0.12 0.11  0.15  0.20  0.13 
Total 
 
865            
The highest and lowest 1 percent of wealth holding households in either 2006 or 2010 have been eliminated 
from the sample. 
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Table 3B: Distribution of Households Experiencing an Increase in Real Wealth Between 




























0.04 0.05 0.06 0.19 
2 
 
0.59  0.20 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.16 
3 
 
0.54  0.21 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.15 
4 
 
0.46  0.13 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.12 
5 
 
0.54  0.17 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.14 
6 
 
0.45  0.11 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 
7 
 
0.46  0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.13 
8 
 
0.49  0.17 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.11 
9 
 
0.32  0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 
10 
 
0.30  0.13 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Note that the highest and lowest 1 percent of wealth holding households in either 2006 or 2010 have been 
eliminated from the sample. 
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 VI. Retirement Outcomes 
  We now turn to an analysis of retirement. The analysis begins with a discussion of retirement 
flows for members of the Early Boomer cohort over the period of the recession. Separate analyses are 
also presented for men and women. Next we compare retirements by members of the Early Boomer 
cohort over the course of the recession with retirements by members of older cohorts over the same age 
span. As noted in Section II, there are many reasons for the differences in the retirement behavior of 
members of different cohorts, so a simple comparison may not isolate the effects of the recession. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the dynamics of retirement and how they compare between cohorts. 
Next we discuss the share of the population experiencing specific adverse labor market outcomes over 
the course of the recession, including layoffs and unemployment. These outcomes are again compared 
among members of different cohorts. Following that we calculate the share of the population from each 
cohort experiencing one or more of a list of adverse events, including changes in pension rules, 
foreclosure, job loss, or other adverse events.  
Retirement Within the Early Boomer Cohort   
  Table 4 reports retirement flows between 2006 and 2010 for members of the Early Boomer cohort. 
Five states are analyzed: not retired, partially retired, completely retired, not relevant (a response to the 
retirement question that says the question is irrelevant because the individual does not work for pay, is a 
homemaker, etc.), and not working-not retired, a state that reflects either unemployment with active job 
search, or nonemployment, where the individual would be willing to accept a job, but does not engage in 
active search. Retirement status is measured by a combination of hours of work and self reported 
retirement status. The exact definition of each variable is reported under Table 4.  
  The row heads indicate status in 2006. Column heads report status in 2010. The numbers falling in 
the first five rows and first five columns report the share of those with the indicated status in 2006 
flowing to the status indicated in the column head in 2010. For example, from row 1, among those not 
retired in 2006, 70 percent remained not retired in 2010, 7.1 percent partially retired, and 11.1 percent  
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completely retired. Not relevant status in 2010 applied to only .2 percent of those who were not retired in 
2006, and 11.7 percent of those who were not retired in 2006 reported themselves as not working but not 
retired in 2010. 
  From the row totals, row 1, column 6, 62.8 percent of the Early Boomer cohort were not retired in 
2006. From the column totals, row 6, column 1, that fell to 49.2 percent in 2010. Thus there was a 
considerable amount of exit from full-time work by this population as they aged from 53 to 58 in 2006, to 
57 to 62 in 2010. The share of the cohort partially retired remained relatively unchanged, increasing from 
10.3 to 11.0 percent, while the percentage completely retired increased from 10.7 percent to 21.6 percent. 
The not working-not retired category, which should capture those who are involuntarily unemployed, 
along with others who may or may not have realistic job market expectations but claim to be available for 
work, increased from 10.0 percent of the cohort members in 2006 to 14.5 percent in 2010. 
  Notice the reversals in status. As seen in row 3, among those completely retired in 2006, 2.1 
percent became not retired in 2010. Another 4.6 percent became partially retired.  From row 2, among 
those partially retired in 2006, 28.3 percent were not retired in 2010. 
  Of course, none of these numbers, neither the shares of those falling in a given retirement outcome 
category in the base or final years spanning the recession, nor the flows among states, can tell us the 
effects of the recession on retirement outcomes or flows. We will attempt some simple comparisons 
among cohorts that may hint at the effects of the recession. Before turning to those comparisons, it is 
useful to discuss differences in retirement outcomes between men and women. 
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Table 4: Retirement Flows from 2006 to 2010 for Early Boomers: Ages 53-58 in 2006. All (weighted) 
 
 
Status in 2006 
 





























2.1 4.6  80.3  7.0 6.0  10.7 
 
Not Relevant  
 






10.3 23.5  9.3  37.7 10.0 
 
Column Total  
Status in 2010 
 
49.2 11.0 21.6  3.8  14.5 100 
Retirement status is calculated based on the number of hours worked per year and, in ambiguous cases, by 
self-reported retirement status as well. Respondents working at least 30 hours per week and 1560 hours or 
more per year are considered not retired. Respondents working less than 100 hours per year are considered 
not working. Those working at least 100 hours per year and 25 hours or less per week or less than 1560 
hours per year are partially retired. If the number of hours per year worked is between 1250 and 1560, but 
the self-reported retirement status is either retired or not relevant, a partially retired status is assigned to 
the respondent. Respondents who report between 1250 and 1560 hours worked, but report not retired to 
the self-reported retirement status question, are considered to be not retired. Respondents who report not 
working to the self-reported labor market status question (J020) and respond not retired or partially retired 
to the retirement status question are considered to be not working and not retired.  If they report not 
working in J020 and report themselves to be retired in the retirement status question, they are considered 
to be retired. If they report not working and not relevant in answer to the self-reported retirement status 




Retirement of Men vs. Women 
  As is well documented in the literature, there are many differences in retirement states and flows 
between men and women. To illustrate these differences, Tables 4A and 4B disaggregate the data in Table 
4, reporting retirement levels and flows separately for men and women. 
  The differences between men and women in the likelihood of falling within a given retirement 
category are obvious from these two tables. Women are less likely to have worked over their full lifetime 
and are more likely to retire at an earlier age when they do work. Proceeding down the last column of each 
table, while 72.0 percent of men were not retired in 2006, 54.4 percent of women were not retired. Thus 
despite recent trends in labor force participation of women and growing continuity of their time spent at 
work, women still exhibit lower full-time labor market activity. Consequently, men were less likely to be 
partially retired (6.8 percent vs. 13.5 percent), while men and women were equally likely to be fully 
retired (10.4 vs. 11.0 percent). Men were less likely to fall in the not relevant category (2.3 percent vs. 9.7 
percent), which is characterized by no time at market work. Men were also less likely to be classified as 
not working and not retired (8.5 percent vs. 11.4 percent). 
  Consider next the retirement flows. Over the four year period from 2006 to 2010, the share of men 
in the cohort classified as not retired fell by 17.4 percentage points. For women, the decline in the 
proportion of cohort members not retired was 10.1 percent. For men, the fraction partially retired 
increased by 2.3 percentage points, while for women, the fraction partially retired declined by 0.8 
percentage points. The share completely retiring was roughly the same for men and women. For men, 11.2 
percent of the cohort completely retired over the period, while for women, the share completely retired 
increased by 10.6 percent. The increase in the fraction not working and not retired was slightly higher for 
men than for women. For men the increase in the share not working and not retired was 5.1 percentage 
points, while for women it was 3.8 percentage points. 
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Status in 2006 
 





























2.0 5.2  81.1  3.1 8.6  10.4 
 
Not Relevant  
 






6.3 31.3 3.0 42.8 8.5 
 
Column Total  
Status in 2010 
 




Table 4B: Retirement Flows from 2006 to 2010 for Early Boomers: Ages 53-58 in 2006. Females (weighted) 
 
 
Status in 2006 
 





























2.2  4.1 79.6  10.3 3.9 11.0 
 
Not Relevant  
 






13.0 18.2 13.6 34.2 11.4 
 
Column Total  
Status in 2010 
 
44.3 12.7 21.6  6.2  15.2 100 
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Differences in Retirement Flows Among Cohorts 
Once again, it is not enough to simply measure changes in labor market outcomes before and 
after the recession to determine how retirements were affected by the recession. Using HRS panel data 
for members of older cohorts, it is possible to determine whether there is a difference in outcomes 
between the members of the HRS Early Boomer cohort, whose retirement decisions were affected by the 
recession, and members of older cohorts, whose decisions were not. By observing the differences in 
retirement flows for members of each cohort, we can see the net effect of conflicting forces shaping 
retirement, such as the increase in retirement age resulting from the wealth effect from falling assets, and 
the acceleration in retirement due to the declining availability of suitable labor market opportunities. To 
be sure, as long as there are other forces at work differentially affecting the retirements of members of 
different cohorts, simple comparisons of labor market flows among members of different cohorts are 
only a useful first step. 
  To compare the differences in outcomes between cohorts, we examine comparable retirement 
flows to those reported for the Early Boomer cohort in Table 4. Table 4C reports retirement flows for 
the War Baby Cohort, ages 53 to 58 in 2000. In Table 4D we find the flows for members of the original 
HRS cohort who were ages 53 to 58 in 1994.  
  By way of background, the unemployment rate in 1994 was 6.1 percent. It was 4.0 percent in 
2000, and 4.6 percent in 2006. Thus the Early Boomers started out in a labor market with unemployment 
that fell between the unemployment rate experienced by members of the two older cohorts serving as 
comparison groups. Four years later, the unemployment rates were 4.5 percent in 1998, 5.5 percent in 
2004, and 9.6 percent in 2010. The unemployment rate decreased by 1.6 percent for members of the 
original HRS cohort and increased by 1.5 percentage points when members of the War Baby cohort 
spanned the same age range. In contrast, reflecting the effect of the Great Recession, unemployment 
increased 5 percentage points over the period of observation for those in the Early Boomer cohort.  
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  Despite these wide differences in the initial levels and changes in the overall unemployment rate, 
the basic retirement flows look similar for members of the three cohorts. Comparing Tables 4, 4C and 
4D, the percentage of Early Boomers not retired declined by 13.6 percentage points between 2006 and 
2010. For the War Babies, the decline in the share of the population not retired was also 13.6 percentage 
points. For the HRS cohort, it was 10.6 percentage points. There were one or two percentage point 
changes in the share who are partially retired over each four year period. For the Early Boomers, the 
share partially retired increased by 0.7 percentage points over the four years. The comparable figures for 
the War Babies and HRS cohorts were 2.0 percentage points and 1.9 percentage points.
15 
  The largest differences among the cohorts are in the changes in numbers not working and not 
retired. For the Early Boomers, there was an increase of 4.5 percentage points over the four years. For 
the War Babies, the increase was smaller, rising by 1.2 percentage points. For the members of the 
original HRS cohort, the share of the cohort not working and not retired fell over the comparable period 
by 7.2 percentage points. This is evidence of an adverse effect of the Great Recession on retirement 
flows. 
                                                 
15 The option "not relevant" is based on different questions in different waves of the survey. Fortunately, the definition is 
consistent for the initial and final year used for any cohort, so changes in retirement flows within cohorts do not reflect the 
effect of a change in definition between the initial and final years examined. But the definition of the "not relevant" category 
asked of members of the HRS cohort in 1994 and 1998 is different from the question asked of the War Babies 2000 and 2004, 
or the Early Boomers in 2006 and 2010. In all six years, the respondent is asked if the retirement status question is irrelevant 
because the individual does not work for pay or is a homemaker. In 1992, however, the respondent is asked to choose the "not 
relevant" option if the individual had not worked for 10 years. In 1994 through 1998, those who had not worked for more than 
a year are asked to pick the "not relevant" category. From 2000 forward, rather than saying anything about how long the 
individual has not worked, after asking the same stem, the question simply says etc.   
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Table 4C: Retirement Flows from 2000 to 2004 for War Babies: Ages 53-58 in 2000. All (weighted) 
 
 
Status in 2000 
 





























4.8  5.3 69.2  15.4 5.4  7.8 
 
Not Relevant  
 






11.0 26.8 17.0 24.4  7.5 
 
Column Total  
Status in 2004 
 
51.7 11.4 19.3  8.9  8.7  100 
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Table 4D: Retirement Flows from 1994 to 1998 for HRS: Ages 53-58 in 1994. All (weighted) 
 
 
Status in 1994 
 





























3.4  4.3 53.5  33.9 5.0 10.2 
 
Not Relevant  
 






12.6 15.0 41.2 13.7 13.8 
 
Column Total  
Status in 1998 
 




  Further comparisons of outcomes among cohorts are reported in Table 5. The first three rows 
repeat the information on basic retirement levels at the beginning and end of the relevant four year 
periods. As noted previously, the population share not retired at the end of the four year period is only 
slightly lower for the Early Boomers exposed to the recession than for those in the older cohorts. 
Moreover, the decline in the share of the population not retired from the beginning to the end of the four 
year period of observation is the same for the Early Boomers and the War Babies at 13.8 percent of the 
cohort. The percent completely retired at the end of the four year period of observation is a couple of 
points higher for the War Babies compared to the original HRS cohort, and an additional couple of 
points higher for the Early Boomers compared to the War Babies. But the 11.1 percent increase in the 
share of the Early Boomers completely retired over the four year period is just slightly less than the 11.7 
percent increase in the percent completely retired experienced by the War Baby cohort over the same 
four year span. 
  As can be seen in the first row 1 of the bottom panel of Table 5, there is only a small difference 
in the fraction reducing their work effort (transitioning from not retired to partially or fully retired, or 
from partially retired to fully retired) between the War Baby and Early Boomer cohorts. The fractions 
working the same amount or increasing their work effort over the four year period are also similar 
between the cohorts. This can be seen in rows 2 and 3 in the bottom panel. 
  Next we consider specific measures of employment change. These include changes in hours of 
work, long term job tenure, direct reports of layoff or unemployment, the acceptance of a window plan 
from an employer encouraging retirement, or participation in SSI or the Social Security disability 
program. In terms of levels of outcomes reported in the top panel of the table, the only substantial 
difference between cohorts in the level observed in the final year of the four year period is in the fraction 
unemployed. That fraction increases by 3 percentage points over the four year period for Early Boomers, 
with a similar (2.9 percentage point) change over the period in the fraction laid off. Layoffs increased by  
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1.8 percent and 0.9 percent over the comparable periods for the members of the HRS and War Baby 
cohorts.  
  In the bottom panel of Table 5, row 6, there is a substantial difference in the percentage reporting 
unemployment at any time in the four year period (e.g., 2008 or 2010 for the Early Boomers), from 
about 3.7 percent for members of the HRS, to 4.5 percent for members of the War Babies, to 7.9 percent 
for members of the Early Boomers. The difference in the share reporting a layoff over the 4 year period 
is smaller, at 5.8 percent for the HRS cohort, 7.3 percent for the War Babies, and 7.7 percent for the 
Early Boomers. As seen in row 4 of the bottom panel of Table 5, there is little change in the share of 
long tenure workers retiring in the Great Recession compared to earlier years. Indeed, there are fewer 
retirements among long tenured workers over the period of the Great Recession. Although there is 
growth over time in the share reporting receipt of SSI or SSDI, there is little difference between the 
cohorts in the fraction entering these programs over the four year period of observation. 
  So far we have observed a few adverse labor market outcomes due to the Great Recession 
against a background of little change in the retirement of long term workers, or in the reductions in work 
effort observed over the period. At the same time, unemployment is up; there is a one or two percentage 
point increase in layoffs compared to the experience of the War Babies; and there is an increase in the 
share of the cohort falling in the not employed, not retired category.  
  We would like to gain further insight into the relation between the relatively constant share of the 
workforce still working full time or part time over the period of the Great Recession, and the increase in 





Table 5: Measures of Levels and Differences in Retirement Status Over Four Year Period: The denominator is 

























Individual's Retirement Status 
Percent not retired  61.1  50.5  65.3  51.5  62.8  49.0 
Percent  partially  retired  8.9  11.2  9.4  11.5 10.3 11.0 
Percent  completely  retired  10.2 15.8  7.8  19.5 10.7 21.8 
Percent working more than 
35 hours per week 
56.4 45.8 60.5 46.5 57.4 44.1 
Percent 10 +  to 14 + years on 
the job 
35.6 23.8 38.8 25.0 35.7 25.4 
Percent reporting layoff  1.9  3.7  2.5  3.4  1.9  4.8 
Percent  unemployed  3.3 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.8 5.8 
Percent taking window plan  1.4  1.8  0.6  1.0  0.4  1.3 
Percent  receiving  SSDI/SSI  2.6 4.2 6.1 8.8 7.8 8.3 
Percent on SSDI  2.2  3.5  4.5  7.4  6.5  6.9 
Percent on SSI  0.4  0.7  1.9  1.9  1.9  2.0 
Change in Individual's Retirement Status 
Percent reducing work  11.1  14.3  12.8 
Percent working same amt.  48.3  50.5  47.8 
Percent increasing work  2.8  3.0  3.6 
Percent of Rs with 10+  years 
in the base year who had 14+ 
years in the end year 
66.9 64.4 71.2 
Percent reporting layoff any 
time in 4 year period 
5.8 7.3 7.7 
Percent reporting 
unemployment any time in 
the 4 year period 
3.7 4.5 7.9 
Percent accepted window 
plan any time in 4 year period 
3.0 2.3 1.9 
Entering SSDI/SSI between 
the base year and end year 
1.6 2.8 1.6 
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  Next we would like to consider how the status of those who are not retired but not working is 
influenced by having experienced a previous layoff. We have just seen in Table 5 that the increase in 
layoffs due to the recession is modest. Table 5A, row 4, shows that a small but increasing share of those 
who are not retired but not working had previously been laid off. In 1998, 13.2 percent of those not retired 
and not working had experienced a layoff. This percentage fell to 9.5 percent in 2004 and rose to 17.4 
percent in 2010. Among those who are laid off, row 5 shows the fraction who indicate they are not 
working and not retired has increased from around a quarter to about a half. More specifically, in 1998, 
25.6 percent of those laid off indicated they were not retired and not working. In 2004, the percentage had 
risen to 28.0. However, in 2010, 55 percent of those laid off indicated they were not retired and not 
working. This is to be expected as those who are laid off and wish to continue working have a more 
difficult time locating a new job. One additional result in the bottom row of the table reports the share of 
those not working and not retired who had experienced a layoff sometime over the past four years (two 
waves). The proportions in 1998, 2004 and 2010 are 22.2 percent, 20.3 percent and 26.7 percent.   
  One should be careful about drawing conclusions related to the total amount of income or wealth 
lost due to unemployment. To the extent that those with lower incomes or wealth are more likely to 
become unemployed, the proportionate decline in income and wealth will be less than the increase in the 
share of the labor force unemployed. 
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1998 2004 2010 
Laid Off and Not Retired- Not Working in 
Indicated Year 
40 23 71 
Total Not Retired- Not Working in Indicated 
Year 
302 241 409 
Total Layoffs in Indicated Year 
 
156 82 129 
Percentage of Those Not Retired- Not 
Working Who Experienced a Layoff 
13.2 9.5 17.4 
Percentage of Those Laid Off Who Are Also 
Not Retired- Not Working  
25.6 28.0 55.0 
Number Experiencing at Least One Layoff 
in Last Four Years and Not Retired-Not 
Working in Indicated Year 
67 49  109 
Percentage of Those Not Retired- Not 
Working Who Experienced at Least One 
Layoff in Last Four Years 
22.2 20.3 26.7  
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  As a next step, Tables 5B and 5C disaggregate the results for men and women respectively. For 
men, the percent not retired is about 7 percentage points lower in 2010 than in 1998 or 2004. But the 
share not retired in the initial year, 2004, is also lower for men in the Early Boomer cohort. Thus when 
we look at the percent of men reducing work, as reported in the first row of the bottom panel of Table 
5B, there is only a point or two difference between cohorts in the percentage reducing work effort. 
Similarly, in the first row of the bottom panel of Table 5C, there is only a small change in the fraction of 
women reducing their work effort between members of the Early Boomer cohort and those in HRS 
cohort. Moreover, fewer women in the Early Boomer cohort reduce their work effort compared to those 
in the War Baby cohort. With regard to the other outcome measures, once again there is no great story 
that emerges regarding differences between the samples of men and women.  
  The bottom line here is that reported unemployment is higher for those experiencing the Great 
Recession, but other measures of activity or related outcomes do not differ much between those affected 
by the recession and members of older cohorts when they were the same age. 
  Table 5D examines these outcomes at the household level. A household is included in the sample 
if either member is 53 to 58 years old in the base year. The variables are similar to those in Table 5, but 
with one major difference. An outcome is said to occur for the household if it has affected either 
member of the household. As a result, these outcomes are not mutually exclusive. A household can be 
classified as being not retired and retired at the same time. Similarly, a household may be counted as 
having a retirement if either member retired over the four year period, and as increasing work if one of 
the spouses returned to work.   
  Again, there are no major differences among cohorts in the changes in retirement status over the 
course of the four year period. Unemployment is higher over the period of the Great Recession. But 
other indicators of adverse economic outcomes show little difference.   
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Individual's Retirement Status 
Percent not retired  74.9  61.1  76.8  61.1  72.0  54.3 
Percent partially retired  5.3  9.6  6.1  10.2  6.8  9.0 
Percent completely retired  9.4  16.3  7.2  19.4  10.4  21.8 
Percent working more than 
35 hours per week 
72.4 58.6 75.4 58.3 68.8 51.6 
Percent 10 +  to 14 + years 
on the job 
44.1 29.1 47.2 31.2 42.4 28.8 
Percent reporting layoff  2.6  4.3  2.6  3.3  1.9  5.7 
Percent unemployed  3.5  1.8  1.5  2.6  2.8  6.5 
Percent taking window plan  2.1  2.4  0.9  1.3  0.4  1.4 
Percent receiving SSDI/SSI  2.9  4.3  6.1  8.9  8.2  9.0 
Percent on SSDI  2.7  4.0  5.2  8.4  7.3  7.6 
Percent on SSI  0.2  0.4  0.9  0.6  1.3  1.9 
Change in Individual's Retirement Status 
Percent reducing work  12.8  14.9  13.8 
Percent working same amt.  58.0  58.5  53.1 
Percent increasing work  2.3  2.8  2.5 
Percent of Rs with 10+  year 
on job in the base year who 
had 14+ years in the end year 
66.0 66.1 67.9 
Percent reporting layoff any 
time in 4 year period* 
6.9 7.9 8.9 
Percent reporting 
unemployment any time in 4 
year period 
3.6 5.3 8.7 
Percent accepted window 
plan any time in 4 year period 
4.3 2.8 2.3 
Entering SSDI/SSI between 
the base year and end year 
1.4 2.8 1.7  
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Individual's Retirement Status 
Percent not retired  48.6  41.1  55.1  43.0  54.4  44.1 
Percent partially retired  12.2  12.7  12.4  12.6  13.5  12.7 
Percent completely retired  10.9  15.3  8.2  19.6  10.9  21.8 
Percent working more than 
35 hours per week 
41.9 34.4 47.2 36.1 47.0 37.3 
Percent 10 +  to 14 + years 
on the job 
27.9 19.1 31.4 19.5 29.6 22.3 
Percent reporting layoff  1.3  3.2  2.5  3.4  1.9  4.1 
Percent unemployed  3.1  1.8  1.7  1.3  2.8  5.2 
Percent taking window plan  0.7  1.2  0.4  0.8  0.5  1.1 
Percent receiving SSDI/SSI  2.3  4.1  6.1  8.8  7.5  7.7 
Percent on SSDI  1.7  3.1  3.8  6.4  5.8  6.2 
Percent on SSI  0.6  1.0  2.9  3.0  2.6  2.2 
Change in Individual's Retirement Status 
Percent reducing work  9.5  13.8  11.8 
Percent working same amt.  39.6  43.3  42.9 
Percent increasing work  3.3  3.1  4.6 
Percent of Rs with 10+  year 
on job in the base year who 
had 14+ years in the end year 
68.5 62.1 75.3 
Percent reporting layoff any 
time in 4 year period* 
4.9 6.7 6.5 
Percent reporting 
unemployment any time in 4 
year period 
3.8 3.7 7.1 
Percent accepted window 
plan any time in 4 year period 
1.8 1.4 1.6 
Entering SSDI/SSI between 
the base year and end year 
1.8 2.7 1.5  
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Households With at Least One Individual Reporting Indicated Retirement Status 
Percent not retired  59.2  48.4  63.2  46.4  59.5  44.7 
Percent partially retired  13.7  14.6  14.3  16.3  16.1  14.7 
Percent completely retired  16.6  24.8  13.3  28.0  15.2  30.6 
Percent working more than 
35 hours per week 
70.6 58.4 74.4 59.2 70.4 56.7 
Percent 10 +  to 14 + years 
on the job 
46.9 32.7 51.4 35.0 47.4 35.8 
Percent Reporting layoff  3.0  5.8  4.0  5.1  3.0  7.4 
Percent unemployed  4.5  2.5  2.4  3.0  3.8  8.3 
Percent taking window Plan  2.3  2.7  1.1  1.3  0.6  2.0 
Percent receiving SSDI/SSI  3.7  5.8  9.1  12.4  10.7  11.2 
Percent on SSDI  3.0  4.8  6.9  10.4  9.0  9.5 
Percent on SSI  0.7  1.0  2.6  2.5  2.7  2.6 
Households With at Least One Individual Reporting Indicated Change in Retirement Status 
Percent reducing work  17.9  20.8  19.5 
Percent working same amt.  60.9  63.0  59.7 
Percent increasing work  5.0  4.7  5.6 
Percent of Rs with 10+  year 
on job in the base year who 
had 14+ years in the end year 
69.7 68.1 75.5 
Percent reporting layoff any 
time in 4 year period 
9.1 10.9  11.6 
Percent reporting 
unemployment any time in 4 
year period 
5.2 6.6  11.0 
Percent accepted window 
plan any time in 4 Year 
period 
4.6 3.0 3.2 
Entering SSDI/SSI between 
the base year and end year 
2.1 3.8 2.3 
Intact couples with at least one spouse falling in indicated age range in base year are included. Thus this 
sample includes out of age range spouses that have not been included in earlier tables. 
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Adverse Events Affecting Employment 
Table 6 documents the incidence of adverse events on the job. Row 1 reports the numbers and 
related percentages of respondents who indicated there was a change in their employment situation that 
encouraged them to leave the job. The details as to exactly what changed are reported in subsequent 
rows. Other columns report for each cohort the relative importance of the event among the employed 
and for the total in the cohort. The bottom row of the first panel reports whether there had been a 
permanent reduction in employment at the firm.  
These data confirm our earlier findings. Although adverse events of this type have received a 
great deal of publicity, the incidence of these events during the Great Recession is no different from 
their incidence in previous years. Roughly 10 percent of employed respondents report leaving their job 
because of these adverse events in all three periods analyzed. We do see evidence of the weakening 
labor market in the recession. Specifically, a larger share of respondents from the Early Boomer cohort 




Table 6:  Adverse Events Affecting the Employment of Early Boomers, War Babies, and HRS Cohorts: Age Eligible (weighted) 


























Employment situation change led to exit  
 
   Supervisor, coworker encouraged exit 
 
   Wages/hours reduced or about to be 
       
   Would have been laid off 
 
   New job duties/location 
 
   Became eligible for pension 
 
   Employer changed health insurance 
 
   Special early retirement incentive offer 
 
   Other reasons 
 
Did your employer experience a permanent 












































































































































































Number of employees   1641  1641  2547 1719  1719  2627 2625  2625  4215 
Unemployed and looking for work   211    8.0  106    4.4  161    3.8 
Laid off or would have been laid off   206   8.1  179  7.2  252  6.0 
Number of observations in the sample  2547   2547  2627  2627  4215  4215 
 
1-  R is asked whether his/her employment situation changed in some way that encouraged R to leave. Follow-up asks how it changed. R reported change in 
employment situation either in end year or intermediate year in the period, e.g., for early boomers in 2010 or 2008.  
2-  Lay off: includes layoffs, temporary or seasonal job that ended; contract over; lack of work/clients/customers; downsizing. 
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Adverse Events Affecting Pensions 
Table 7 reports adverse events affecting the pensions held by members of these three cohorts.
16 
The percentage reporting they lost their pension is about twice as high during the Great Recession as 
over comparable periods experienced by older cohorts, 6.1 percent vs. 3.3 percent and 2.9 percent in 
earlier years. Many fewer report their pensions changed during the Great Recession. One reason why is 
that the questions are different in 2008 and 2010 from earlier survey years.  
A substantially higher proportion of those still with a DB plan in 2006 reported their DB 
coverage changed by 2008 or 2010, while fewer changes in coverage were reported by members of the 
Early Boomer cohort who had DC plans compared to those from older cohorts. The bottom line is 
reported in Table 2B. Average pension wealth increased by about 8 percent for members of the original 
HRS cohort, with the entire increase coming from wealth held in DC plans. In contrast, total pension 
wealth remained steady for members of the Early Boomer cohort over the period of the Great Recession, 
with DB values declining and DC values growing. Remember again that rollovers of pensions will move 
funds from the pension category to the IRA category. In both periods the growth in IRA balances was 
substantial, growing by roughly half over a four year period.
                                                 
16 Variable definitions in Table 7 are as follows. Definitions are presented for Early Boomers. Analogous definitions apply to 
other cohorts: 
1-  The dashes signify that the required information is not available. 
2-  Lost pension: Rs reported having pension coverage in 2006/2008, but working at the same employment with no 
coverage in 2008 or 2010, respectively. 
3-  Pension rules changed: R reported pension rules changed for his/her plan either in 2008 or 2010. 
In survey years prior to 2008, respondents were asked a general question about any rule changes; if the rules 
governing your pension have changed since last interview. But in 2008 and 2010 they are asked this question about 
each specific plan separately.  
4-  DB/comb coverage: if R reported working at the same employment and had at least one DB or combination plan in 
2008 or 2010. 
5-  DB Pension Coverage Changed: if R reported at least one DB/combination plan in 2006 and while working at the 
same employment had no DB/combination plan in 2008 or 2010. 
6-  DC/comb coverage: if R reported working at the same employment and had at least one DC or combination plan in 
2008 or 2010. 
7-  DC Pension Coverage Changed: if R reported at least one DC/combination plan in 2006 and while working at the 
same employment had no DC/combination plan either in 2008 or 2010. 
8-  DB Pension Rules Changed: If R reported at least one DB/combination plan in either 2008 or 2010 and reported a 
change in its rules. This question was not asked in surveys before 2008. 
9-  DC Pension Rules Changed: If R reported at least one DC/combination plan in either 2008 or 2010 and reported a 
change in its rules. This question was not asked in surveys before 2008. 
10- Reduced stocks: R reported his most important DC allocations changed to less stock either in 2008 or 2010. This 
question was not asked in surveys before 2004. 
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Table 7: Adverse Events Affecting the Pensions of Early Boomers, War Babies, and HRS Cohorts: Age Eligible (weighted)  


































46 3.3 1.8 60 2.9 1.4 
Pension rules changed 
      Plan terminated 
       Frozen benefits 
       Stopped contributing 
      Contribution level changed 
      Required age/service changed 
      Benefits formula changed 
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Adverse Events Affecting Housing 
Table 8 reports the experience of the Early Boomer cohort with adverse events affecting their 
housing. Twenty-eight percent of those with housing and 29 percent of the sample reported there is a 
poor housing market in their area. But only 3.2 percent of homeowners fell behind in their mortgage, 
with 0.9 percent having reported they faced possible foreclosure. Most had paid off enough of their 
mortgage that they were not going to be under water as a result of the recession. Moreover, while 
multiple adverse events are a major issue for younger members in the population, only 0.3 percent of 
this older sample reported having lost a job and facing foreclosure or possible foreclosure.  
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Multiple Bad Events - Job Loss Plus 




















1-  Poor housing market in R’s area: R rated housing market in his/her area as poor either 
in 2008 or 2010. 
2-  Multiple Bad Events: R reported unemployed and looking for work in 2008 or 2010 or 
reported being laid off or left job fearing being laid off in 2008 or 2009 and reported 




The retirement wealth held by those ages 53 to 58 at the onset of the Great Recession in 2006 
declined by a relatively modest 2.8 percentage points by 2010. In more normal times, their wealth 
would have increased over these four years. Members of older cohorts accumulated an additional 5 
percent of wealth over the same age span. To be sure, a part of that accumulation was the result of the 
upside of the housing bubble.  
The adverse labor market effects of the Great Recession are more modest. Although there is an 
increase in unemployment, that increase is not mirrored in a decline in full-time work or partial 
retirement. All told, the retirement behavior of the Early Boomer cohort looks similar, at least so far, to 
the behavior observed for members of older cohorts at comparable ages.  
Very few in the population nearing retirement age have experienced multiple adverse events. 
Although most of the loss in wealth is due to a fall in the net value of housing, because very few in this 
cohort have found their housing wealth under water, and housing is the one asset this cohort is not 
likely to cash in for another decade or two, there is time for their losses in housing wealth to recover. 
The wealth holdings of poorer households were least affected by the recession. Relative losses are 
greatest for those who initially had the highest wealth when the recession began. 
Among our more specific findings: 
1. Social Security and pensions, accounting for 55 percent of the total wealth of those 
approaching retirement at the onset of the recession, retained their value and thus played a major role in 
cushioning the effects of the recession on total wealth. 
2. Those in the bottom quartile of wealth holding households experienced only a 1 percent fall 
in real wealth. Social Security accounts for 79 percent of their total wealth.  
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3. Although 51 percent of households in the Early Boomer cohort experienced a decline in real 
wealth, 48 percent experienced an increase. Losers outnumbered gainers in all but two asset categories, 
DC pension wealth and IRA pension wealth.  
4. Ordering households by real wealth, 39 percent of the members of the lowest wealth decile 
experienced a loss in wealth. In contrast, 70 percent of the households in the highest wealth decile 
experienced a loss in wealth. The share of households experiencing at least a 20 percent decline in real 
wealth ranges from 12 percent of households falling in the lowest wealth decile up to 48 percent of 
households in the highest wealth decile. 
5. The share of households experiencing a gain in wealth includes 49 percent of the households 
in the lowest wealth decile in 2006, falling to 30 percent of the households in the highest wealth decile. 
Thirty percent of the households in the lowest wealth decile experienced a wealth gain of at least 20 
percent, while 9 percent of the households in the highest wealth decile experienced a gain of at least 20 
percent. 
6. The share of the population not retired, as measured by a combination of hours of work and 
self reported status, fell from 62.8 percent of the members of the Early Boomer cohort in 2006 to 49.2 
percent in 2010. For men, the share of the population not retired declined by 17.4 percent over the four 
year period from a base of 72.0 percent, while for women the decline was 10.1 percent from a base of 
54.4 percent.  
7. The 13.8 percent decline in the share of the population classified as not retired in the Early 
Boomer cohort is identical to the decline observed for members of the War Baby cohort, six years 
older, and greater than the 10.6 percent decline observed for members of the original HRS cohort 
twelve years earlier.   
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8. The increases in the fractions unemployed and those reporting they are not employed but not 
retired, was substantially greater during the period of the Great Recession than in comparable periods 
experienced by members of older cohorts.  
9. Thus a key question remains. While unemployment was higher during the recession than in 
earlier years, employment was not reduced and retirements were not accelerated. One reason is that 
some who could retain their jobs postponed their retirement. Second, those who were laid off were less 
likely to leave the labor force. On net, the increase in the number who remained at work was enough to 
offset the job losses of those who had been laid off.  
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Appendix 1: Procedures used in empirical calculations of Table 1  
  Observations with total wealth falling in the top and bottom one percent are excluded. 
  The sample includes all age eligible households in 2006 and 2010.  Age eligible respondents 
include respondents with one member in their household who is 53 to 58 in 2006. Households that 
experienced a divorce, separation, entry of new spouses or partners during that period are excluded from 
the sample. 
  Social Security wealth is calculated as of claiming age in 2004. Data from version 2 of the HRS 
calculations, directed by Kandice Kapinos, are used. These data include own, spouse and survivor 
benefits where the household is entitled to them. Calculations assume the respondent claims benefits as 
soon as eligible and that earnings end during the 2004 period. This means that many people are a 
number of years away from being able to claim their Social Security benefits at age 62. We use the 
"claim now" scenario to put the Social Security benefits on the same footing as the defined benefit and 
defined contribution pensions, which are evaluated as of the last date the person is observed to work. 
This is only a rough approximation for the Social Security data because we do not have adequate data to 
update the claim now values for Social Security between 2004 and 2010 associated with additional 
work. The mean of the ratio of the benefits if claim now to the benefits at normal retirement age is 0.87; 
the ratio varies between zero and 1.6, with one extreme value equal to 2.6. For those who are already 
receiving benefits in the base year, the actual benefit amount is included. 
  More specifically, the present value of Social Security wealth in 2006 is calculated as the present 
value of Social Security wealth in 2004 from the HRS calculations by Kapinos increased to the base 
year of 2010. The 2004 figure for Social Security wealth is multiplied by 1.058 to the 6th power, then 
multiplied by 1/1.028 to the fourth power. As noted in footnote 9, in all calculations we use a CPI 
increase of 2.8 percent per year and a nominal interest rate of 5.8 percent, approximations taken from the  
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Report of the Board of Trustees of the Social Security Administration. The present value of Social 
Security wealth in 2010 and the present value of Social Security wealth in 2006 expressed in 2010 
dollars multiplies the present value of wealth in 2004 by 1.058 to the 6th power. 
  DB benefits are the sum of expected benefits and any remaining benefits if the respondent 
reported already receiving benefits. Expected benefits from current jobs are prorated values for the most 
important DB plan and are based on self-reported data. DB benefits from previous jobs are in current 
dollars as of 2006 and 2010. If DB plans, from current or previous jobs, are in pay status the present 
value of the remaining benefits as of 2006 and 2010 are calculated. DC balances are the sum of all DC 
accounts from respondents’ current job and/or previous jobs. Although, financial asset variables are 
imputed and available in the Rand HRS data set for 2006, they are not available for 2010. Therefore, we 
do not use the Rand data in this calculation and instead impute missing values using a nearest neighbor 
approach. When comparing data across earlier years we do use the Rand data and take their imputations 
for both periods being compared.  
  We impute for missing, don’t know, or refused responses. We use a variety of methods to 
impute depending on the number of observations available. These include a mixed method, a 
regression which forms the basis for a nearest neighbor imputation, or when few observations are 
available, a hot-decking process. Imputations are also used when values are reported only in the 
form of brackets. The imputation sample includes only those who meet the required conditions.  
For example, DB values are imputed only from that set of observations reporting they have a DB 
plan. The explanatory covariates for pension variables include employment status, age, 
education, race, earnings, marital status, occupation, industry, union membership, if government 
employee, and job tenure. For financial assets, we used gender, marital status, and if there were 
one or two earners in the household.   
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  Results are weighted. We have used household weights from the 2006 survey.     
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Appendix Table 1A: Components of Wealth in 2006 and 2010 For the Median 10% of Wealth Holding Households with at Least One 
Member Born from 1948 to 1953. Weighted. 
 
Source of Wealth 



















Total     $581k  100  $621k  100 1.09  $649k  0.96 
Social Security Plus Pensions  372  64.0  420  67.6 1.17 415  1.01 
Social Security  255  43.9  284  45.7 1.13 285  1.00 
Pension Value  117  20.1  136  21.9 1.27 130  1.05 
     DB Value  84  14.5  90  14.5 1.18  94  0.96 
     DC Value  33  5.7  46  7.4 1.53 37  1.24 
          Current DC Balances   26  4.5  31  5.0 1.35 29  1.07 
          Current DC in Stocks   18  3.1  18  2.9 1.20 20  0.90 
Net House Value  122  21.0  88  14.2 0.70 137  0.64 
Real Estate  16  2.8  9  1.4 0.56 18  0.50 
Business Assets   8  1.4  21  3.4 2.63  9  2.33 
Net Value of Vehicles  16  2.8  15  2.4 0.88 18  0.83 
Financial Assets   20  3.4  16  2.6 0.76 23  0.70 
     Direct Stocks Holdings  7  1.2  10  1.6 1.43  7  1.43 
IRA Assets  26  4.5  52  8.4 1.93 29  1.79 
          IRA in Stocks Value  19  3.3  33  5.3 1.65 21  1.57 
IRA Plus Stocks Holdings Plus 
DC in Stocks 
49  8.4  68  11.0 1.48  54  1.26 
Observations 200  193  200 
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Appendix Table 1B: Components of Wealth in 2006 and 2010 For Households Falling in the Lowest Quartile When Ranked According to Wealth. 
Weighted. 
 
Source of Wealth 



















Total     $111.1k  100  $123k  100 1.11  $124k  0.99 
Social Security Plus Pensions  93.0  83.7  104.2  84.7 1.12  103.9  1.00 
Social Security  88  79.2  97.2  79.0 1.10 98.3  0.99 
Pension Value  5  4.5  7  5.7 1.40 5.6  1.25 
     DB Value  2.6  2.3  3.7  3.0 1.42 2.9  1.28 
     DC Value  2.4  2.2  3.2  2.6 1.33 2.7  1.19 
          Current DC Balances   2  1.8  2.5  2.0 1.25 2.3  1.09 
          Current DC in Stocks   1.3  1.2  11.1  0.9 0.85 1.4  0.79 
Net House Value  11.7  10.5  14.1  11.5 1.21 13  1.08 
Real Estate  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.7 1.0 1  0.90 
Business Assets    1  0.9  0.6  0.5 0.60 1.1  0.55 
Net Value of Vehicles  4.5  4.1  4.6  3.7 1.02 5  0.92 
Financial Assets   -1.7  -1.5  -3.5  -2.8 2.06 -2  1.75 
     Direct Stocks Holdings  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.3 2.00 0.2  2.00 
IRA Assets  1.7  1.5  2.1  1.7 1.24 2  1.05 
          IRA in Stocks Value  0.8  0.7  1.2  1.0 1.50 0.9  1.33 
IRA Plus Stocks Holdings Plus DC 
in Stocks 
2.5  2.3  3.0  2.4 1.20 2.8  1.07 
Observations 478  478  478 
In calculating bottom quartile, wealth rankings are unweighted although the data in the table are weighted. 
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Appendix Table 1C: Households with Negative Net House Value, Gross House Values, 
and  Mortgages in 2006 and 2010. (weighted)  
 
 
Households with Negative 
















































































Table 2A: The Value of Components of Wealth For Members of Various HRS Cohorts Over the Period 
from the Second to Fourth Wave They Are in the Survey in Current Dollars: weighted 
 























Total      $507k $609k $657k $758k $780k $847k 
Social  Security  Plus  Pensions  291 333 364 387 426 473 
Social  Security  162 180 181 202 229 256 
Pension  Value  130 153 182 185 197 218 
     DB Value  106  119  128  130  135  141 
     DC Value  24  34  54  55  62  77 
          Current DC Balances   19  25  46  40  47  51 
          Current DC in Stocks   -  -  -  -  29  25 
Net House Value  69  82  85  131  150  128 
Real  Estate  32 34 32 44 32 26 
Business  Assets    20 22 26 29 34 31 
Net  Value  of  Vehicles  15 15 16 17 18 17 
Financial  Assets    53 75 81 94 70 84 
     Direct Stocks Holdings  23  40  49  51  34  42 
IRA  Assets  27 47 55 55 52 87 
          IRA in Stocks Value  -  -  -  -  38  56 
IRA Plus Stocks Holdings 
Plus DC in Stocks 
- - - -  110  137 
Observations  3401 3401 2028 2028 1949 1949 
Observations with the top and bottom 1% of wealth are excluded. 
The present values of Social Security wealth are calculated to be the same in real terms in the beginning 
and end year. See the description in Appendix 1. 
We adjusted the DB values in 1994 in a similar way to the 2006 data.   
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Table 2B: The Value of Components of Wealth For Members of Various HRS Cohorts Over the Period 
from the Second to Fourth Wave They Are in the Survey in 2010 Dollars: weighted 
 























Total      $788k $848k $866k $894k $871k $847k 
Social  Security  Plus  Pensions  453 463 479 457 476 473 
Social  Security  251 251 239 239 256 256 
Pension  Value  201 213 240 218 220 218 
     DB Value  164  165  169  153  150  141 
     DC Value  37  48  71  65  70  77 
          Current DC Balances   30  34  60  48  53  51 
          Current DC in Stocks   -  -  -  -  33  25 
Net  House  Value  108 115 111 154 167 128 
Real  Estate  49 47 42 52 35 26 
Business  Assets    31 30 35 34 38 31 
Net  Value  of  Vehicles  23 21 20 21 20 17 
Financial  Assets    83  105 106 111  78  84 
     Direct Stocks Holdings  35  56  64  60  38  42 
IRA  Assets  42 66 72 65 58 87 
          IRA in Stocks Value  -  -  -  -  43  56 
IRA Plus Stocks Holdings 
Plus DC in Stocks 
- - - -  123  137 
Observations  3401 3401 2028 2028 1949 1949 
 
 
 
 